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LOSS OF CONSORTIUM:
WHY LIMIT IT TO THE HUSBAND?
I NTRODUCTION
It was well settled at an early date that a husband had a legal right to
his wife's services and companionship, and that a separate action existed
in his favor for any wrongful or negligent interference with this right
"per quod consortium ainisit."' The common law rationale was that such a
right was incident to the marriage relationship and could not exist without it.2
The courts of today, with some exception1s, 3 still accept the common law
view.
4
The wife, on the other hand, was not vested with the right to recover
for loss of consortium; " she held no proprietary right to her husband's
scrvices." She also could not institutc suit in her own namhe. t The Married
1. E.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Honey, 63 F. 39 (8th Cir. 1894); Birmingham
Southern RR. v. Linter, 141 Ala. 420, 38 So. 363 (1904); Marri v. Stanford St. Ry.,
84 Conn. 9, 78 At. 582 (1911); Waller v. First Savings & Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025,
138 So. 780 (1931); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Tice, 124 Ga. 459, 52 S.E.
916 (1905); Citizens St. ly. v. Twiname, 121 Ind. 375, 23 N.E. 159 (1890);
Newhirter v. F-latten, 42 Iowa 288 (1875); Kelly v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 168
Mass. 308, 46 N.E. 1063 (1897); Mageau v. Great Northern R.R., 103 Minn. 290,
115 N.W. 651 (1908); Skoglund v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 45 Minn. 330, 47 N.W.
1071 (1891); Smith v. City of St. Joseph, 55 Mo. 456 (1891); Middle v. Leigh,
75 N.D. 418, 28 N.V.2d 530 (1947); Hopkins v. Atlantic St. Lawrence R.R.,
36 N.I. 9 (1857); Garrison v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n., 207 N.Y. 1,
100 N.E. 430 (1912); llollcman v. tlarward, 119 N.C. 150, 25 S.E. 972 (1896);
Kimberly v. lowland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906); Sellick v. City of
Janesville, 104 Wis. 570, 80 N.W. 944 (1899).
2. E.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R.R v. Hloney, supra note 1, at 42; Little Rock Gas
& Fuel Co. v. Coppedge, 116 Ark. 334, 172 S.W. 885 (1915); Baldwin v. Kansas
City Ry., 208 Mo. 201, 231 S.W. 280 (1921).
3. Marri v. Standford St. Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 At. 582 (1911); Bolger v, Boston
Elevated R.R., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910); Ilarber v. Bushouse, 254 Mich.
187, 236 N.W. 222 (1931); Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N.W.
724 (1915); ilehnstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E. 2d 611 (1945);
Martin v. United Electric R.R., 71 R.I. 137, 42 A.2d 897 (1945).
4. Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry., 78 N.H. 289, 99 AtI. 298 (1916).
5. Lynch v. Knight, 9 1I.L. Cas. 577, I1 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861); Lord Wensleydale
in stating the majority opinion, "the loss of such service of the wife, the husband,
who alone has all the property of the married parties, may repair by hiring another
servant; but the wife sustains only the loss of the comfort of her husband's society
and affectionate attention, which the law can not estimate or remedy. She does not
lose her maintenance, which he is bound to still supply; and it can not be presumed
that the wrongful act complained of puts an end to the means of support without
an averment to that effect."
6. 3 BLACKSrONrE, COtIEN'TARIES 143; In the following cases the court resolved
the "services" argument by contending that the wife could not show a loss of services:
Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933); Feneff v. N.Y. Cent.
& Hudson River R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909); Smith v. Nicholas Bldg.
Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915); IIARPER & JAZWS, THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 8.9, at 639 (1956).
7. VF.aN.Eu, AMERICAN A'AMI.Y LAWS § 179 (1935); However the wife of the
King of England could institute suit. Tlhe reason given by Lord Coke is that the wisdom
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\Vomen's Acts, although they relieved many of the incapacities of coverture,'
did not create a right in favor of a married woman to recover for her loss
of consortium due to a negligent act of a third party.9 \Vith the exception
of a few holdings 10 and scattered dissents,' judicial attitude still refuses to
grant the wife recovery.2
The purpose of this paper is to trace the development of the action for
loss of consortium from the common law to its present state, for it is evident
that this phase of our law has not kept pace with the progress shown in the
field of domestic relations generally.'
Loss OF CONSOR-1,JM UNDER 'jOE Co.rrroN LAw
According to the common law husband and wife were one person, 4
that person being the husband. ' A married woman had no capacity to sue,' 6
nor could she hold property as a femme sole.' 7 As a result, any wrong
committed upon her was either left in abeyance or was actionable only if
of the common law would not have the king troubled and disquieted with private and
petty causes. He is presumed to be busied with public affairs, and it will not be intended
that he would stoop to marital coercion. See note, 37 Am. Dec. 709 (1841).
8. FLA. STAT. § 708,08 (1957), typical of statutes in other states wherein women
are given the right to sue and be sued, hold property as a femme sole, contract and be
contracted with, etc.
9. Feneff v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909);
Stout v. Kansas City Term Ry., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913).
10. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Cooney v. Moomaw,
109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953); Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351,
(1957), 299 S.W. 2d 41, emphasis on total loss of consortium; Brown v. Georgia-Ten-
nessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); Acuff v. Schmidt, 248
Iowa 242; 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956), emphasis on total loss of consortium; Delta Chevrolet
Co. v. Ward, 211 Miss. 256, 51 So.2d 443 (1951); llipp v. E. 1. DuPont De Nemours
& Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921), later overruled by Hinant v. Tide Water
Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
11. E.g., McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 299 (1949) (dissent);
Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1952) (dissent without opinion); Bernhardt v.
Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1918) (dissent).
12. Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937);
Ripley v. Ewell, supra note 11; Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631
(1912); Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 Atl. 538 (1918); Feneff v. New York Cent.
& Hudson R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909); Bernardt v. Perry, supra note
11; Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y. Stipp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1900); Smith
v. Nicholas Building Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915); RESTATEMENT
ToRTs § 695 (1938); Holbrook, The Change in The Meaning of Consortium, 22
Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1923).
13. See PROSSER, I'ORTS § 948 (1941); HARPER, TORTS 566 (1933); See
Holbrook, subra note 12; Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 CoLnM.s L.
REv. 651 (1950).
14. 3 BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTARIES 143.
15. Ibid.
16. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAw § 179 (1935); Even if husband and wife
are living apart, see Beach v. Beach, 2 Hill 260 (N.Y. 1842); Robinson v. Reynolds,
1 Aikens 174 (Vt. 1826). Some authority allowing wife to sue if husband forces her
to live apart from him, see Love v. Moynehan, 16 Ill. 277 (1855).
17. Real property given jure uxoris to husband. See Am. JuRa Husband and Wife
§ 55 (1940).
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her husband were properly joined. 1  Then recovery could be granted to
the wife for her injury,'1 ' and the husband was afforded a separate action
in his own right.2 ' Compensatory damages could be granted to him for his
loss due to: abduction, or the carrying away of his wife; adultery; having
criminal conversation with 1er; or for his loss of consortium .2' A husband's
right of consortium at the common law included the right to the service
of his wife to be rendered to him, together with the right to her society
and the comfort incident to her companioislip."" Hc was allowed recovery
for any wrongful deprivation of this right even though the wife was not accus-
tomed to do any physical labor for the lusband,'-' and though the pecuniary
value of such services could not be accurately ascertained.24 The only limita-
tions which were placed upon his recovery were contributory fault by the
wife25 and the necessity that the defendant would be directly liable to the
wife.'-"
The tendency of the common law courts was to place much emphasis
on services,$" although [hey did not attempt to separate the elements
cnbracing consortium. :S They strictly enforced the view that the wife owed
a duty to lprovide arious marital services to her husband and any impairment
thercof by a third person was actionable. The husband, on the other hand,
owed no such duty to provide these various marital services to his wife;
hence any injury inflicted upon the husband would not breach any duty
owing to the wife and as such was not actionable per se. Services, as defined
by the courts, were not only those services provided by a domestic servant,
18. For a detailed discussion see 27 AM. JUR. husband and Wife § 491 (1940).
19. Ibid.
20. The common law expressed in \Valler v. First Savings & 'Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025,
138 So. 780 (1931), "A personal injiry to a married woman caused by a tort of a third
person gives rise to two causes of action: one for her personal pain and suffering, and the
other for the husband's consequential loss of her society and service, and for the expense
incurred for medical attention and nursing." Citing 30 C.J. Husband and Wife
§ 961, 966 (1923).
21. 3 BLACKSTONE, CO!,KME'IAR iEs 139.
22. Reeves v. Lutz, 179 Mo. App. 61, 162 SAV. 280 (1914); citing Marri v.
Stanford St. Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 At. 582 (1911); Stout v. Kansas City Term. Ry.,
172 Mo. App, 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913.
23. See Reeves v. Lutz, supra note 2, at 287 citing 4 STrORLAND, DAMACGs
§ 1252 (1904 3rd ed.).
24. See Metropolitan St. Ry. v. Johnson, 91 Ga. 466, 18 S.F. 816 (1893);
Indianapolis St, Ry. v. Robinson, 157 Ind. 414, 61 N.E. 936 (1001); Bruce v. United
States Ry. of St. Louis, 175 Mo. App. 568, 158 S.\V. 102 (1913); See also the
cases cited in Sur:iAND, I)AsrACIS ipra note 23.
25. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Honey, 63 F. 39 (8th Cir. 1894); Maxem v.
Toniek, 280 N.'. Slipp.9 39 (1935); REsTxrATEENT, ToRs § 693 (1938).
26. Ibid.
27. Bolger v. Boston Elevated R.R., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910); Feneff
v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R.. 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909); Kelly v. New York,
N. 1-. & II. R.R., 168 Mass. 308, 46 N.E. 1063 (1897); Lynch v. Knight, 9 ILL.
Cas. 577, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861). In Blair v. Scitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich.
304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915), the court stated that neither spouse could recover where
she hath no separate interest in anything during coverture." I BL..KcsroNEu, Cos-
28. For a detailed discussion see 27 Ai. JuR. Husband and Wife § 499, 505 (1940).
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but also the conjugal society of a wife.2 " Although such services were lacking
in pecuniary market value, the majority of courts held that it was in the
province of a jury to determine the pecuniary value of the loss.3 '.
In 1867, a New York court in the case of Hoard v. Peck1 allowed a
husband to recover for loss of his wife's consortium where a druggist had
sold her large quantities of laudanurn without her husband's consent.
The court's ruling was based on the fact that the defendant bad aided the
wife to breach a duty to her husband, and as such was liable to him in the
same way as a lover, cnticer or harborer. In 1886 a similar action was
brought in a North Carolina court .''1'he facts were the same, with the
additional circumistancc that the plaintiff had forbidden the defendant to
sell the laudanuin to his wife. Here, too, it was held that the husband
could recover for his loss of consortium, extending the doctrine of the
husband's right to his wife's services to an unusual degree and emphasising
the proprietary nature of the right.a
The law in relation to husband and wife and their relative rights to
consortium was at this point settled and seemed to be universally accepted.
The wife was not vested with the right to her husband's services, :t and could
not maintain the action for the loss of consortium. However, at least one
court held that the action did exist in favor of the wife; only her marital
status prevented its enforcement.'" Due to the scarcity of cases reported
following the latter line of reasoning, we can conclude that the action as
interpreted by the courts at that time did not include the wife. The husband,
on the other hand, had a clear right; the intentional or unintentional violation
of which gave rise to a cause of action.
29. Birmingham Southern R.R. v. Litner, 141 Ala. 420, 38 So. 363 (1904);
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Dunn, 52 I11. 260, 4 Am. Rep. 606 (dictum); Brown v.
Kistlernan, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912); Citizens St. Ry. v. Twiname, 121
Ind. 375, 23 N.E. 159 (1890); Kelly v. New York, Nil. & 11. R.R., 168 Mass. 308,
46 N.E. 1063 (1897). But -we Feneff v. N.Y. Cent. & 1Hudson R.R., 203 Mass.
278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909); Mageau v. Great Northern R.R., 103 Minn. 290, 115
N.W. 651 (1908); Skogland v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 45 Minn. 330, 47 N.\. 1071
(1897); Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry., 78 N.H1 289, 99 Atl. 298 (1916).
30. Reeves v. Lutz, 179 Mo. App. 61, 162 S.W. 280, at 287 (1914) (juror's
experience without evidence of value).
31. 56 Barb. 202, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867).
32. Hlolleman v, Ilarward, 119 N.C. 150, 25 S.E. 972 (1896).
33. Lippman, supra note 13, at 661, 662.
34. Blackstone says, "We may observe that in these relative injur cases notice is
only taken of the wrong done to the superior of the patties related, by the breach and
dissolution of either the relation itself, or at least the advantages accruing therefrom; while
the loss of the inferior by such injuries is totally unregarded. One reason for this is that
the inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care or assistance of the superior
as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can
suffer no loss or injury. The wife cannot recover damages for beating her husband for
she hath no separate interest in anything during coverture." 3 BLACKSTONE., Conrj
MENTARIES § 143.
35. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889).
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THE EIFFECt OF liIE NiARRIFu) \VOAN'S Acrs
The emancipation of wonen presented many new problems. Did the
husband still have the right to his wife's services, or did his right come to an
end? Did the wife always have equal rights, left in abeyance only because
of coverture, or was she now cloaked with new rights in the marriage rela-
tionship? It is interesting to note that almost all states after the passage of
the enabling acts extended recovery to the wife for criminal conversation
and alienation of affectionsi ' The wife has also been allowed recovery for
the interference with the marital relation by reason of the sale of excessive
quantity of drugs to the husband.31 Although these new actions favoring
married woman are almost universally accepted, the rationale from state to
state is not at all consistent. :" It is held by some courts that these rights
always existed, but that the common law incapacity of coverture prevented
their enforcement?" The majority, on the other hand, contend that the wife
is now given an equal right to the marriage relationship.0  Both schools of
thought appear to he faulty, the first on the ground that there are few cases
cited from the common law which inferred that such rights had ever
existed.4 Moreover, they could not have existed, since the action was
premised on the right to services, which right the wife did not possess.4 2 The
latter view seems to abandon the historical basis of the action, loss of
services, and now contends that a wife has an equal interest in the marital
relationship. Hence these courts now premised the action upon the breach or
violation of an inherent marital right. However the majority of these same
courts contended that the husband's right still remained independent, and
loss of his wife's services still remained the basis of his action4 3 Some author.
36. The extension of the right was refused in Minnesota, Kroessin v. Keller, 60
iinn. 372, 62 N.W. 438 (1895), and in Maine, Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503, 20 Atl.
83 (1890). Later the following "heartbahn" statutes were enacted abolishing the action.
ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 114, 115 (1940); CAL. Civ. CoDE § 43.5 (Deering 1949);
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-3 (1953); FLA. STA'r. § 777.01 (1957); IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 2508 (1946); Micn. STAT. ANN. § 25, 191 (1952); N. J. REV. STAT. § 2:37-A
(1937); N.Y. CIVIL I RACTiCE AcT § 61-b.
37. Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912); Moberg v.
Scott, 36 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917).
38. Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1933) (the court seemed
to like the public policy idea of recovery). Parker v. Newman, 20 Ala. 103, 75 So.
479 (1917); Dodge v. Rush, 28 App. Cas. 149, (D.C. 1906); l'urner v. Heavrin,
182 Ky. 65, 206 S.W. 23 (1918); Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N.E. 890
(1906); Rott v. Goering, 33 N.D. 413, 157 N.W. 294 (1916) (all of the above cases
claimed the wife had an equal right in the marital relationship).
39. Feneff v. N.Y. Cent. & lludson R.R., 203 Mass 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909);
Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 554, 23 N.E. 17 (1889); Lynch v. Knight, 9 11,L.
Cas. 577, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861).
40. Oppenhein v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 14 N.E. 227, 231 (1933) (contending
that a woman is on equal footing as husband since the "enabling acts"),
41. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 554, 23 N.E. 17, 18 (1889), cases cited
where the inference could be drawn. The only case where the court actually stated
that the action existed was Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 11 Eng. Rep. 854
(1861)
4. See authority cited in note 6 supra.
43. Chicago B. & Q. R.R, v. Honey, 63 F. 39 (8th Cir. 1894), an expression
of the majority. But see eases cited in note 5 supra. See also Lippman, supra note 13.
[VOL. XIII
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ities limited the husband's action to intentional, or, as the court termed them,
direct invasions.'4 However, an overwhelming majority held that the Married
'Woman's Acts did not take anything froin the husband. 45 Still other juris-
dictions, noticing the inconsistencies bcginning to appear, denied recovery
to either spouse.4 6
Inevitably there began to appear in our courts throughout the country
the issue of whether a wife could now maintain an action for loss of con-
sortium due to a negligent injury inflicted upon her husband. The majority
of cases resolved the issue in the negative,4 7 holding that the negligent
injury to her husband was too indirect and consequential to her, 48 and that
any allowance of damages would result in double recovery for a single
wrong.
4 t
After the passage of the enabling acts the courts in their attempt to keep
in the spirit of stare decisis and at the same time open their hearts to the
feeling of emancipaion of women, actually allowed the law to fall into a
state of confusion and false realism. The courts found it reasonable that the
action for loss of consortium take on two distinct meanings depending upon
which spouse sought to bring it. One was for the loss of services owed
directly to the husband, the violation of which amounted to a direct loss
to him, and the other for a denial of a marital right owed directly to the
wife, the impairment of which amounted to a direct loss to her. The court
further reasoned that any negligent injury inflicted upon the husband would
not be a violation to the marital right, at least not a direct violation, but
any intentional act would fall under an actionable violation of the marital
right. Perhaps the majority of our judiciary are in accord with Lord Porter in
Best v. Samuel Fox & Co 50 wherein he stated, "The common law is a his-
torical development rather than a logical whole, and the fact that a particular
doctrine does not logically accord with another or others is no grounds for
its rejection."
44. Marri v. Stanford St. Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911); Blair v. Seitner
Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915), husband's right of action
limited to direct loss of a service performed for him by the wife.
45. E.g., Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Honey, 63 F. 39 (8th Cir. 1894); Birmingham
Southern R.R. v. Litner, 141 Ala. 420, 38 So. 363 (1904); Lewis v. Atlanta, 77 Ca.
756, 4 A.S.R. 108 (1898); Citizens St. Ry. v. Twiname, 121 Ind. 375, 23 N.E. 159
(1890); Newhirter v. Flatten, 42 Iowa 288 (1875); Kelly v. New York N.H. & H. R.R.,
168 Mass. 308, 46 N.E. 1063 (1897).
46. See authority cited in note 3 supra.
47. See authority cited in notes 9 and 12 supra.
48. Ibid.
49. But see 1litaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
50. 119521 2 K.B. 639 (The conclusion reached is also interesting, the
court refused to grant the wife recovery for "partial" loss of consortium, indicated
that if there was a total loss the wife could recover. Ilusband was emasculated. What
constitutes total? Perhaps death.)
19581
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MODERN AccIurTANCIE OR l)ISAI'APROVAL OF T1E COMMON LAW
Ill 1921, a North Carolina court,' refused to follow the weight of
authority, and held that no sound reason existed for allowing recovery to
the husband and denying recovery to the wife, and as such became the first
court to allow recovery by the wife for her loss of consortium due to a
negligent injury to her husband. Before inuch acceptance could be given to
this decision, the same court reversed itself in a later decision.52 1 Hence the
law at this point was steadfast in its refusal to recognize equal rights in
married women. In 1950 the controversial case of i-litaffer v,. Argonne Co."
was before a federal court in Washington, 1. C., wherein a married man was
injurcd due to the negligence of his employer. As a result lic became incap-
able of having sexual relations with his wife. He recovered for his loss under
the Longshoreman's and larbor Workers Compensation Act in a separate
suit.5 4 His wife, the plaintiff, brought suit in her own name to recover for
her loss of consortium. The court inl a lengthy opinion reviewed all of the
reasoning advanced by the weight of authority and refused to blindly follow
the doctrine of starc decisis. Instead they took a progressive step ' in bursting
through the inconsistent, illogical barrier which lay in their path and held
that a wife could maintain this action. The court found no difficulty in over-
coming the "too remote" argumCt acccpted by the vast majority by con-
tcnding that the loss of consortium was direct regardless of the lack of
iiiten]t which caused the act. It was further stated by the court that the denial
of the action to the wife by the majority was based on a series of fictions and
a use of words. The court in effect Made practical a very sound theory that
when the logic of a rule fails so should the rule. It is astounding to think
that a simplc application of sound logic together with good sense reasoning
could result in an opinion so basically contrary to the modern ""cight of
authority.
Although many of our legal writers were quick to advocate the thinking
advanced in the 1-itaffer case, the case produced little change in the law.
A few courts were in agreenieit with the case; however, they felt that any
change should bc brought about by the legislature.5 7 Florida, in Ripley v.
51. Ilipp v. E. I. I)uPont De Neniours & Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318
51 . Ilinnant v. Tide 'Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 SE. 307 (1925).
53. See authority cited in note 10 supra.
54. 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. § 901 (1946).
55. See authority cited in note 13 supra.
56. Ibid.
57. Jeune v. Del E. Webb Const. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954);
Frauzen v. Zimmerman, 127 Colo. 381, 256 P.2d 897 (1953). Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d
420 (Fla. 1956); Le Eace v. Cincinnati N. & C. Ry., 249 S.\V.2d 382 (Ky. 1952);
Lo Rocca v. American Chain & Cable Co., 23 N.J. Super. 195, 92 A.2d 811; Nelson
v. A. M. Lockett Co., 206 Okl. 334, 243 P.2d 719 (1952); Carrett v. Reno Oil Co.,
271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Ash v. S. S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash.2d
345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953).
[VOL. Xlll
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Ewell,r" a case of first impression before the supreme court, decided to fol-
low this line of reasoning, agreeing that any change in the law should be
brought about by the legislature, not the court. The Florida court did settle
one point directly while other courts giving a similar impression did not
choose to use concise terms. In rendering the opinion the court stated,
"although the laws relating to married women have been construed in favor
of married women we cannot say that women are on an exact parity with
men." The court, in effect, lent a little logic to a wife's inability to recove
in this action. The Florida court, in the absence of legislation to the con-
trarv, found itself bound by the archaic common law, while in other opinions
by the same court they have indicated that the common law, although in
effect in this state, should not be utilized beyond practicality. It is also
interesting to note that Florida adheres to the theory that when the logic
of a rule fails so should the rule. It is submitted that the court was using
the legislature as its scapegoat in successfully avoiding the controversial
issue before them. In comparing the discretion which the court had at its
disposal with the resulting opinion in the case it would appear that the case
merely stood for the proposition that women are not on an exact parity with
men unless the legislature deems them to be. However, inasmuch as the
court seemed to be in favor of legislative enactment, it can be concluded
that Florida and a few other jurisdictions are more readily adaptable to a
change in the law than the vast majority of courts5 9 Florida's position is
further substantiated by the fact that Florida's Wrongful Death Statute6 0
allows a wife to recover for her loss of consortium due to the wrongful death
of her husband.
With the exception of a few dissents"' it can be said that the Hitaffer
case received little acceptance. Recently an Iowa case62 denounced the
common law view and accepted the Hitafer view. Hence to date we have
but a few cases which allow the wife recovery for her loss of consortium due
to a negligent injury inflicted upon the husband."-
CONCLUSION
All of the reasons and theories"4 refusing the wife the same right as
the husband have disappeared. Aside from all of the fictions created by the
courts in their refusal to allow recovery to the wife, the only real objection is
the courts refusal to disregard the strict and technical view of the doctrine
58. 61 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1956).
59. The Florida court in reviewing the Ilitaffer case expressed their accord in
the sondness of the Ititaffer opinion, however found itself -handcuffed" by the
existing common law.
60. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1957).
61. See authority cited in note I1 supra.
62. Acuff v. Schniit, 248 Iowa 242, 78 NAV.2d 480 (1956).
63. See authority cited in note 10 sumra
64. Incapacity of coverture, indirect injury, double recovery.
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of stare decisis. r11-is is one of the phases of law in which the doctrine must
be disregarded in order to achieve clarity and understanding in our law. The
courts need not look to the common law to determine the status of women-
they need only look to our modern acts, our constitutional amendments, and
even more basic, our society and its acceptance of equal rights of women.
It is submitted that there is but a biological similarity to the common law
woman and the woman of today. The common law was certainly not meant
to be an immovable force which would act as a barrier to changes in society.
It was most certainly the spirit of our common law that the court should act
as a fulcrum in maintaining an equilibrium between our common law and
an advancing society. In this respect the courts should disregard the out-
moded philosophy of the common law and accept the sound reasoning
advanced by the minority. Refusing recovery to either spouse certainly
is not the answer. It is suggested that the courts begin with the common law
basis of the action, loss of services, and apply it to a modern contention
that a wife is now entitled to these services and a uniform, logical, and
equitable result can be achieved. In Florida and a handful of other states,
perhaps legislative enactment is the answer; at least from a practical viewpoint,
the pitfallsn5 of overturning a century of law can be avoided. Is it too much
to be desired that Florida and the majority of states restore logic into this
phase of our law? It is consoling, in the light of recent decisions, to note
that there is a gradual trend in this direction.
RALPH P. Ezzo
65. In Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1956), the court concerned itself with
the tremendous amount of litigation which would flood the courts in the form of
stale" claims not yet outlawed by the Statute of Limitations.
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